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Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the primary objective of
Hungary’s central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low inflation allows the economy to function
more effectively, contributes to better economic growth over time and helps to moderate cyclical fluctuations in output and
employment.
In the inflation targeting system, since August 2005 the Bank seeks to attain price stability by ensuring an inflation rate near
the 3 per cent medium term objective. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank,
performs a comprehensive review of the expected development of inflation every three months, in order to establish the
monetary conditions consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of careful consideration
of a wide range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic developments, the inflation outlook, money and
capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and to enhance transparency, the Bank
publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy decisions. The Report presents the inflation
forecasts prepared by the Economic Analysis and Research and Financial, as well as the macroeconomic developments
underlying these forecast. The Report is published biannually, with partial updates to the forecasts also prepared twice a year.
The forecasts of the Economic Analysis and Research and Financial Analysis Department are based on certain assumptions.
Hence, in producing its forecasts, the Department assumes an unchanged monetary and fiscal policy. In respect of economic
variables exogenous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous issues of the Report are applied.
The analyses in this Report were prepared by staff in the MNB’s Economic Analysis and Research and Financial Analysis
Department under the general direction of Ágnes Csermely, Director. The project was managed by Mihály András Kovács,
Deputy Head of Economic Analysis, with the help of Zoltán Gyenes, and Barnabás Virág. The Report was approved for
publication by Ferenc Karvalits, Deputy Governor.
Primary contributors to this Report also include: Péter Bauer, Gyõzõ Eppich, Péter Gál, Zoltán Gyenes, Áron Horváth, Éva
Kaponya, András Kornél Kisgergely, András, Komáromi, Mihály András Kovács, Zsolt Lovas, Ádám Martonosi, Zsuzsa
Munkácsi, Benedek Nobilis, György Pulai, Róbert Szemere, Tímea Várnai, Barnabás Virág. Other contributors to the analyses
and forecasts in this Report include various staff members of the Economics Analysis and Research and the Financial Analysis
and the Financial Stability Department.
The Report incorporates valuable input from the Monetary Council’s comments and suggestions following its meetings on
11th of August and 25th of August 2008. The projections and policy considerations, however, reflect the views of staff in the
Economics Analysis and Research and the Financial Analysis Department and do not necessarily reflect those of the Monetary
Council or the MNB.
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The August issue of the Quarterly Report on Inflation projects slow disinflation,
provided that our basic assumptions (the most important of which are an
exchange rate of EUR/HUF 232 and oil prices around USD 137) hold true.
Consumer prices will most likely grow at a rate around 4 per cent in 2009 and
3 per cent in 2010. At the same time, we project subdued improvement in
economic growth, the rate of which is not expected to exceed the economy’s
capacity until 2010. As a result, the output gap will remain negative over the
entire forecast horizon.
On the whole, the global economic environment changed for the worse in the
first half of the year: after dynamic growth in the first quarter, European data
indicated a slowdown in economic activity in the second quarter. Although the
volatile quarterly figures cause some uncertainty in the exact assessment of the
overall trend, a pronounced slowdown in European growth is becoming
increasingly clear. In addition to the tighter lending conditions, the sharp rise
in crude oil prices has also played a key role in the increasingly subdued growth
climate.
In the first half of the year, there was a gradual recovery in Hungarian
economic performance, primarily due to the outstanding performance of
agriculture, and brisk growth in industrial exports in the first quarter.
Nevertheless, GDP growth still fell short of growth in production capacity, and
thus the negative output gap continued to widen. Regarding the longer-term
prospects, the lack of a material turnaround in domestic absorption, together
with the slowdown in the European business cycle results in uncertainty about
the pace of upturn in economic activity.
Global inflationary pressure increased significantly during the second quarter
of 2008. Despite the substantial tightening in monetary conditions stemming
from central bank interest rate hikes and improved risk appetite toward the
region, the appreciation of the forint exchange rate was only partially able to
compensate for the deteriorating global inflation environment. As a result,
forint-denominated prices of imported goods continued to rise. However,
rising prices continued to mostly characterise commodities and energy-related
product groups, while the import prices of a wide range of processed goods
declined to a certain extent.
Although rising energy prices were reflected in producer prices, due to the
negative output gap companies only passed on a part of their increased costs in
their sale prices. As a result, the increase in the consumer price index subsided
and settled at a level slightly below 7 per cent.
Despite the unfavourable growth climate, wage dynamics remained strong in
Q2, due to the increase in the minimum wage for skilled workers and high
inflation. In addition, as the majority of those who lost their jobs in the
previous quarters basically left the labour market, the level of free labour
market capacities did not increase very much, also contributing to the high
growth rate of wages.
Slow disinflation, deteriorating growth
prospects
Recent growth data point to trends
which are unfavourable for the
long-term growth prospects
The pass-through of global inflation was
limited by poor domestic growth
Due to the combined effect of improved
productivity and high wage dynamics,
inflationary pressure declined slightly on
the labour market
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On the whole, however, the improving productivity of the private sector
contributed to a slight drop in cost pressure from the labour market. The
growth in unit labour costs is still high compared to the inflation target,
because temporary factors (such as the excellent performance of agriculture)
also contributed to the initial high productivity figures during the year.
Despite the dynamic growth in nominal wages, the real disposable income of
households barely improved in the first half of the year, due to the declining
employment rate and stagnating real non-wage incomes. This meant that
income growth had a disinflationary effect from the demand side, which is well
illustrated by the weak growth in household consumption expenditure.
In our forecast, we anticipate a slow recovery in economic growth. We project
that the pick-up in domestic consumption may prove to be somewhat stronger
than the deceleration in export growth. Even though the positive performance
of agriculture may offset the combined effect of slower-than-expected external
demand and restrained domestic consumption in our short-term growth
prospects, the long-term prospects appear to be much more pessimistic than
anticipated in the May Report, for two reasons. On the one hand, weaker
external demand and the stronger forint exchange rate jointly reduce the
contribution of net exports to growth. On the other hand, sustained high oil
prices and the fall in empoyment inhibit a recovery in domestic consumption.
We strongly anticipate that the European slowdown will be more severe than
expected, and this represents a tangible downside risk to the domestic growth
path as well.
The negative output gap continues to be a key factor in the anticipated
disinflation process, forcing companies to arrest wage growth and raise prices
more slowly than in the past. Additionally, our projections assume that
commodity prices will cease rising across the entire forecast horizon.
As the decline in employment was not accompanied by a similar increase in the
available labour pool in the last year, there is a significant risk of a sustained
decrease in labour supply in the Hungarian economy. As a consequence, it is
possible that a large portion of the recently observed growth deceleration has
affected potential output. An additional risk may be found in the increase in
nominal wages, if these adjust more than expected to the earlier high inflation
level. Both scenarios might cause higher inflation compared to the baseline. On
the other hand, disinflation may be facilitated by the stronger-than-expected
decline in external demand and international commodity prices. On the basis
of these factors, on the whole we perceive symmetric risks around the baseline
scenario of our projection.
Looking ahead, slow improvement in
growth is expected, with downside risks
A gradual disinflation process is
projected, with almost symmetrical risks
OVERVIEW
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Inflation forecast fan chart
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(The forecasts are conditional: the baseline scenario represents the most probable scenario, which applies only if all of the
assumptions presented in Chapter 3 materialise; unless otherwise indicated, it represents percentage changes on the previous year.)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Actual Projection
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2.4 6.0 5.1 2.8 2.7
Consumer price index 3.9 8.0 6.3 4.1 3.0
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based)* 3.9 3.9 2.5 1.9 2.1
Fiscal impact on demand**,2 0.4 -3.6 -1.5 (↔) -0.1 (↔) -0.8 (↔)
Household consumption 1.9 -1.9 0.3 1.4 2.8
Gross fixed capital formation -2.5 0.1 2.1 5.4 6.3
Domestic absorption 1.2 -0.4 1.0 2.5 3.4
Exports 19.0 14.2 10.1 7.4 8.7
Imports3 14.7 12.0 8.8 7.5 8.9
GDP*** 3.9 (4.0) 1.3 2.2 (2.4) 2.6 (2.4) 3.4
Current account deficit**,3
As a percentage of GDP 6.0 5.0 4.9 (↑) 4.8 (↑) 4.8 (↑)
EUR billions 5.4 5.1 5.3 (↑) 5.5 (↑) 6.0 (↑)
External financing requirement**,3
As a percentage of GDP 5.3 4.0 3.4 (↑) 2.8 (↑) 2.5 (↑)
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4 8.2 8.0 8.8 6.5 6.5
Whole-economy employment5 0.7 -0.1 -1.6 -0.6 0.1
Private sector gross average earnings6 9.4 (8.1) 9.1 (8.2) 10.2 (8.5) 7.2 6.5
Private sector employment5 1.2 0.9 -1.7 -0.7 0.2
Unit labour costs in the private sector5,7 4.4 7.3 3.7 4.1 3.1
Household real income* -0.3 -3.4 1.3 2.0 2.7
1
For technical reasons, this indicator may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the long term, however, it follows a similar
trend. 
2
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) balance; a negative value represents a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
As a result of uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics, from 2004 the actual import figure and current account deficit/external
financing requirement may be higher than suggested by official figures, or our projections based on such figures. 
4
Calculated on a cash-flow basis. 
5
According to the CSO LFS data. 
6
According to the original CSO data. The numbers in brackets refer to wages excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses. 
7
Private sector unit labour cost calculated with a wage index excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
* MNB estimate. 
** Forecast in May 2008.
↔ means that the expected path of the variable will be similar to that of published in the May 2008 Report. 
↑ means that the expected path of the variable might be higher compared to the May 2008 Report. 
*** Data not adjusted for calendar-day variations are shown in brackets.
Summary table of the baseline scenario
1.1  A CLIMATE OF GRADUALLY
DETERIORATING GLOBAL ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND INFLATION
In the first half of 2008, the international climate changed for
the worse on the whole: after a favourable first quarter, the
European data for Q2 suggested downturn in economic
activity, which has not occurred in the euro area since the
beginning of the 1990s. Although the high volatility of
quarterly changes results in some uncertainty in assessing the
general trend accurately, a marked slowdown in European
growth can be detected more and more clearly, even
according to the available business climate indicators. Along
with the tighter lending conditions, the radical increase in oil
prices has also played a decisive role in the deterioration of
economic conditions.
In line with the slowdown in industrial growth in the euro
area and the region, domestic processes also continued to
decelerate, although atypical working-day effects in the first
half of the year render accurate assessment of the industrial
trend uncertain. In addition, the gradual change in the
composition of Hungary’s export partner countries may have
slowed the deceleration of domestic exports, as the
expansion of Hungarian exports is increasingly shifting to
Central and Eastern European countries and Russia, which
exhibit higher growth potential than euro area countries.
The slowdown in industrial performance and exports is
essentially related to the international slowdown in industrial
activity, but in addition to this, the strong exchange rate
appreciation since April may also have had a detrimental
effect. However, our calculations suggest that this latter
effect is not significant yet; since the effect of the exchange
rate on exports may mostly be reflected in data with a delay
of several quarters.
Since publication of the previous Report, the international
inflation environment has been marked by further increases
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1  Macroeconomic developments
Chart 1-1
International economic growth (GDP)
Source: Eurostat.
Note: preliminary data for 2008 Q2.
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Chart 1-2
Industrial production in the region and the euro
area
(seasonally adjusted data)
Source of international data: Eurostat.
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Chart 1-3
Changes in the structure of the domestic exports of
goods
(in percentages)
Source: CSO foreign trade statistics.
Note: Eastern and Central European countries include Czech Republic,
Croatia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania.
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in inflation, primarily caused by soaring oil prices. Among
global commodity prices, oil prices, and consequently, energy
prices have been drastically rising for the last few months,
while food and metal prices have not changed considerably.
1
Along with intensifying global inflation pressure, commodity
prices have become the main contributors to deteriorating
growth prospects after the tightening of lending conditions.
It is worthy of note, however, that the steady upward trend
in oil prices has been followed by a significant correction in
the last few weeks.
1.2  WEAK TURNAROUND IN GROWTH,
WITH NO RECOVERY IN DOMESTIC
DEMAND
With regard to the Hungarian economy’s performance in H1
2008, a slight recovery in economic growth was observed,
caused primarily by the remarkably good performance of
agriculture, and industrial production and exports which
were still buoyant in the first quarter.
2
Nevertheless, GDP
growth still lags behind the expansion of production
capacities, i.e. the negative output gap has opened up further.
As for the long-term prospects there is some degree of
uncertainty, as domestic expenditure has not showed a
turnaround, and consequently for the future it is questionable
to what extent Hungarian factors may be able to support a
recovery in economic activity, particularly in light of the
worsening business conditions in Europe.
With regard to the recovery in domestic consumption, the
deteriorating terms of trade resulting from soaring energy
prices also represent a risk. As a result, since Hungary is a net
energy importer, growth in national disposable income was
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Chart 1-4
World market price of commodities*
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
* Average of U. K. Brent, Dubai, and West Texas Intermediate, equally
weighted.
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Chart 1-6
GDP, GDI and terms of trade
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Chart 1-5
Contribution of items on the expenditure side to
GDP growth*
(seasonally adjusted data)
* Considering that time series with chain-type indices are not additive,
aggregation errors were distributed between the items according to their
weight. Dynamics calculated from the resulting adjusted time series may
be less informative from a quantitative perspective (they differ from
those calculated from the original data), however, the chart may still
reflect prevailing trends accurately. 
Note: Q2 data for 2008 is preliminary, and only adjusted by working days.
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0
0
 Q
1
0
0
 Q
3
0
1
 Q
1
0
1
 Q
3
0
2
 Q
1
0
2
 Q
3
0
3
 Q
1
0
3
 Q
3
0
4
 Q
1
0
4
 Q
3
0
5
 Q
1
0
5
 Q
3
0
6
 Q
1
0
6
 Q
3
0
7
 Q
1
0
7
 Q
3
0
8
 Q
1
contribution to growth
(percentage point)
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
per cent
(annual growth)
Households' consumption 
expenditure
Government expenditure
Gross fixed capital
formation
Inventories +
Errors and ommissions
Net export
GDP (right-hand scale)
1 Several analyses (e.g. Samantha Dart: “The fundamental factors behind rising food and fuel prices”, Goldman Sachs, 2008) have been published, pointing out that
energy and food commodity prices tend to move in closer conjunction as a result of the increasing use of biofuels. This relationship may have been interrupted
temporarily in the last quarter, even though the recent adjustments in oil prices repeatedly brought petroleum prices closer to the prices of agricultural commodities.
2 Presumably, the expansion of the state performance may have contributed to the increasing output in the second quarter. Due to the methodology of statistical
measuring, it may have been caused by increase in number of associations between doctors and patients resulting from abolishment of visit fees and hospital per
diem fees.
much slower than GDP growth in the most recent period. If
energy prices remain high over the longer term, domestic
consumption may be stranded at persistently low levels.
Following the unfavourable data seen in recent years, gross
fixed capital formation continued to decline in 2008 Q1. It
should be noted, however, that the negative data is largely
due to poor, presumably deferred, government investments,
while corporate sector investments were relatively good.
3
Weak consumer confidence, shrinking employment,
stagnating real household income and oversupply in the real
estate market may have led to diminishing household
accumulation appetite, which also contributed to slow
investment dynamics. It should, nevertheless, be noted that
the weight of the first quarter is rather small relative to the
annual investment data, therefore its relevance in forecasting
annual trends is quite limited.
The decline in domestic actual consumption dynamics was
largely due to a strong reduction in government consumption
and social benefits in kind. As household consumption
expenditure growth was very gradual, and fell significantly
behind the more dynamic growth in wages at the beginning
of the year, the turnaround was slower than expected. The
reason for the discrepancy between increased wages and the
consumption/saving decision of households is the fact that,
due to the decline in other income, household income is
improving much less dynamically than wages (for details,
refer to Box 1-1 below).
MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
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Chart 1-7
Household’s consumption, investment and savings
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3 Small scale agricultural investments rose sharply, primarily due to European Union subsidies. Investments of the market service sector experienced a similar upsurge,
but the growth was shared by several small businesses. Likewise, investments were relatively strong in the manufacturing industry considering the extremely strong
base of last year.
4 As the share of the key income components appeared to remain relatively stable over time, we believe that using the 2006 data for the purposes of this projection
should not cause material errors in our estimates.
As regards the consumption/saving behaviour of Hungarian
households, the data indicate quite divergent, at times even
contradicting processes in the first half of 2008, marked by dynamic
wage growth and a considerable increase in financial benefits on the
one side, and barely perceivable consumption growth and subdued
financial saving and investment on the other side. On the basis of
economic theories and statistical estimates, this box text seeks an
explanation for the consumption/saving decisions of households over
the past six months.
The literature provides several explanations for household
consumption lagging behind sudden wage growth. According to the
most popular view, which we also adopt in our forecasting systems, if
households perceive the growth in current incomes as being
temporary, they will not change their consumption decisions
significantly. Some of the income-related conditions of this explanation
were in place in the first half of 2008. Due to falling employment,
combined with inflation at persistently high levels, the rapid rise in
wages at the beginning of the year was presumably not accompanied
by improved income expectations, which is consistent with the poor
confidence indices measured in that period. If households had
perceived significant temporary growth in income, we should have
seen evidence of caution, and consequently, a stronger attraction to
savings. The available data, however, do not appear to corroborate this.
We therefore assume that there are additional important effects behind
this phenomenon.
The source of more than one-third of the total income of households is
so-called ‘other income’. As the relevant statistics may be significantly
delayed (by as much as two years), measurement of this income
component is more uncertain than the measurement of the other two
key components. Therefore, we can only rely on estimates regarding its
current status.
As National Account figures are only available for 2006, we will use that
data to attempt to understand this year’s developments.4 70 per cent of
Box 1-1: Developments in real household income at the beginning of 2008
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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households’ other income comes from enterprises or financial
investments. More detailed information is available on these items. As
the remaining 30 per cent includes rental fees of owned homes (mainly
settled as statistical items) and other, hard-to-simulate transfers, our
analyses here will focus on the previous items.
Examining the components of entrepreneurial income, it is evident that
its sources are highly concentrated, and they come primarily from four
sectors (agriculture, construction, trade, real estate).
In contrast with the negative performance in 2007, current GDP data
on the production side at the beginning of the year showed clear signs
of a turnaround for agricultural production. Good weather conditions
produced outstanding average yields for several types of produce,
which presumably had a positive impact on household income
stemming from agricultural production. However, this impact may
have been offset to some extent by the low purchasing prices caused
by the additional supply. In contrast with the upswing in agriculture,
the other three key sectors shaping household income continued their
tendency of poor performance this year, a trend which was initially
observed in 2006. This holds particularly true for the construction
industry, which may be consistent with the extremely poor
performance of construction and new home construction in the most
recent period.
Another key element in other household income is income from
financial assets. The financial portfolio of households has been subject
to significant restructuring since 2000. The share of investments with a
higher risk/return profile has been gradually increasing at the expense
of the previously preferred, more conservative investment instruments
(thanks to the widespread use of investment fund units, life insurance
and pension funds). As a result of this restructuring, yields realised on
the financial instruments of households may now be more closely
connected to global money market and capital market processes. Since
the money markets have recently registered poor yield performance,
they may have had a negative impact on the other income of
households.
Finally, it should be noted that the whitening caused by the measures
implemented by the government over the past year and a half may
Chart 1-8
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Chart 1-9
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Chart 1-10
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On the production side of GDP, the private sector recorded
dynamic growth in 2008 Q1, whilst the value added of the
public sector did not change significantly. The growth of
private sector value added relative to the end of the previous
year may primarily stem from two sectors: first of all,
agriculture,
6
and secondly, the temporarily stronger dynamics
of industrial production, resulting from the temporary
improvement in external demand.
7
In addition to those
mentioned earlier, sectors primarily connected to internal
growth (market services and construction) continue to
perform poorly, which may further increase the uncertainty
surrounding the recovery in domestic demand.
With poor domestic and weakening external demand, growth
continues to be sluggish, further widening the output gap,
which has been continuously negative since 2007. Therefore,
the disinflationary effect of slack demand is expected to
increase relative to the previous year.
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have also reduced the other income of households. This is because the
former, forced entrepreneur statuses are increasingly being recorded as
employee statuses, due to the tightening of tax audits. Therefore, a
practical mechanism would be to record small entrepreneurial income
as wages in the statistics. As wage statistics do not show any significant
whitening effect,5 we can assume that the whitening of small
entrepreneurs enters the economy at lower-than-average wage levels,
and thus does not lead to a material upward bias in wages. It should also
be noted that the whitening of the economy as a whole is somewhat
questionable. The substantial surge in cash demand last year might
even indicate that more economic activities are moving into the
informal sphere.
On the whole, the total income position of households at the beginning
of 2008 must have been far behind the growth of average wages. This
was primarily the result of the continuing poor performance of the
sectors producing for domestic consumption (except agriculture),
which are key contributing factors to other income, declining
employment and falling financial yields realised in the unfavourable
global money and capital market climate. This result may account for
the weak consumption and saving decisions of households and the low
confidence index.
Chart 1-11
Main indicators of household consumption and
income
(seasonally adjusted data)
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5 For details, see Box 1-2.
6 It should be noted that initial data for the year are quite unreliable for this sector, as production-related information received during the year might require significant
revision of data.
7 Although detailed GDP data are not available for Q2, we believe that the contribution of agriculture to growth may have been significant, while in line with the
international economy, industry showed considerable adjustment.
Chart 1-12
Contribution of items on production side to the
growth of private sector value added*
(seasonally adjusted data)
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* Considering that time series with chain-type indices are not additive,
aggregation errors were distributed between the items according to their
weight. Dynamics calculated from the resulting adjusted time series may
be less informative from a quantitative perspective (they differ from
those calculated from the original data), however, the chart may still
reflect prevailing trends accurately.
1.3  HIGH WAGE INCREASES COMBINED
WITH DECREASING EMPLOYMENT
The labour market continued to experience steep wage
increases in Q2, while companies adjusted to rising costs by
larger downsizing than anticipated. Since mid-2006, wages
have grown at a rate exceeding 8 percent, and in the first two
months of Q2 regular wage figures also reflected stronger-
than-expected growth.
Although the rate of wage growth remained high regardless
of the size of corporations, projecting its precise trend is
difficult because of the marked deceleration in regular wage
components for companies with over 250 employees, the
figures of which are not distorted by regulatory changes. 
A closer look at the sector level reveals decelerating wage
dynamics in the manufacturing industry, while wage growth
in the sector of market service providers continues to remain
at the earlier high level.
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Chart 1-13
Developments in the output gap*
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Chart 1-14
Annual growth of gross average wages and regular
wage components in the private sector and for
companies with over 250 employees*
(seasonally adjusted data)
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The rates of wage growth officially released by the CSO for the period
since mid-2006 are likely to have reflected, in part, the effects of
whitening. However, whitening is not assumed to have a material
influence on 2008 wage developments. One explanation for this is that
the increase in skilled workers’ minimum wage has led to a rise in firms’
costs, in addition to triggering a sharp reduction in employment and, in
part, a pick-up in inflationary pressures in the private sector. 
As statistical data on the effects of whitening are not available, the two
approaches that can be taken to measure its size are to scrutinise the
statistical behaviour of gross average earnings published by the CSO, on
the one and, and to look for breaks in the co-movement of wages with
other time series, on the other. 
In the previous Reports, we presented several methods to filter out the
whitening effects appearing in the wage statistics.8 Three of those
methods are based on the same core principle: it is presumed that
certain parts of the economy – certain sectors or certain corporate
categories – are not distorted by whitening, while others are.
Accordingly, starting from 2006 Q3 – when the tightening of tax
audits began – we have approached the real wage developments of
the whitening sectors with projections based on the historic
relationship between the whitening and non-whitening parts of the
economy. As regards the fourth method, we quantified the level shifts
in wages observed at the time the regulatory measures came into
effect.
Box 1-2: Some thoughts on the correlation between wage statistics and whitening
8 See Gyõzõ Eppich and Szabolcs Lõrincz: Three methods to estimate the whitening-related distortion of wage statistics, MNB Occasional Papers, 66 and Box 1-1:
Methodological issues regarding wage development, in our May Report on Inflation.
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At the same time, it should be noted that the first three methods will
indicate whitening every time an industry or corporate category –
whether it is presumed to be whitening or not – is subject to a group-
specific shock. Several such shocks affected the economy in the last one
to one and a half years (the increase in the minimum wage for skilled
workers and fiscal adjustment may have impacted different sectors of
the economy in different ways), which raises the question as to what
extent these earlier methods are still suitable for filtering out potential
whitening which took place at the beginning of 2008.
In the course of 2006-2007, the three methods described above could
be considered plausible: on the basis of the jumping wages approach,
we were able to attribute 2.2-2.3 percent of the estimated 2.5 percent in
whitening to the contribution liabilities on the double guaranteed
minimum wage introduced in September 2006. This effect distorted
wage information upwards in 2006 and 2007.
Nevertheless, none of these four methods makes it easy to decide which
part of the wage increase related to the increase in minimum wages for
skilled worker is due to whitening, and which part can be attributed to real
changes. We have no method at our disposal with which we can measure
whitening directly, and hence we can only use indirect deductions to
estimate the probability of further significant upward distortions
materialising in wage statistics as a result of a potential whitening effect.
Suspicion of whitening may be supported by the fact that various
anecdotal information and wage surveys suggest significantly lower
wage increases than evidenced by macro statistics. On the other hand, it
is important to emphasise that the wage increase indicated by macro
statistics contains, in addition to ‘actual’ wage increases, a composition
effect attributable to changes in the economic structure and changes in
the labour demand for specific jobs. A good example is the decline of the
typically low-wage textile industry in Hungary, which, by reducing the
share of low-wage sectors in employment, drove up the national
economic wage level. At the same time, since these composition effects
are also reflected in changes in productivity, they should not be excluded
from wage indices for unit labour cost calculations. The chart below
shows that this year, the composition effect significantly contributed to
the observed wage increase, which can be primarily attributed to the
dynamic restructuring of economic sectors.9 When we compare the index
filtered for the composition effect (wage inflation) with the information
from the HAY survey, the difference is substantially smaller.
It is worth mentioning that in 2007, the actual wage increase data
practically coincided with the wage inflation data. On the other hand, it
should also be noted that the actual wage increase significantly
exceeded the expected increase. This may also happen in 2008. From a
different perspective, in the years preceding 2007, there was always a
difference between HAY actual/expected wages and wage inflation,
and thus the difference in 2008 might be considered normal. Another
explanation of the systematic difference may be that the HAY survey,
like wage surveys in general, is not fully representative in the case of the
private sector. This makes 2008 particularly problematic, as most of the
companies participating in different surveys are typically well-paying
businesses; many of them are multinational corporations which as
unaffected by the nearly 15 percent increase in the guaranteed
minimum wage this year.
In conclusion, we may state that in comparison with the figures of the
HAY wage survey, we see no obvious evidence of the whitening-related
distortion of wage statistics released by the CSO. Moreover, additional
arguments also appear to indicate that in 2008, the whitening-related
distortion of wage statistics is no longer considerable.10
• To our understanding, among the companies with relevance for wage
statistics, the increase in the guaranteed minimum wage mainly
affected those companies with a small number of employees.
However, these companies have faced substantial downsizing since
9 On the TEÁOR 2 subsectoral levels (Standard Classification of Economic Activities, Code 2) we calculated the so-called wage inflation index under the staff number
structure of the previous year, and excluded the composition effect.
10 Although at the level of the national economy the ratio of employees with minimum wages is around 30 per cent, they are not distributed evenly between different
company types. While 70 percent of the employees of companies with 4 or less employees receive the minimum wage, this ratio is only 8 percent for companies with
at least 5 employees. Assuming that the source of whitening is the elimination of minimum wage employment, whitening-related distortion is significantly smaller
for companies relevant for the purposes of the CSO’s wage statistics – those with over 4 employees – than for the private sector as a whole.
Chart 1-15
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In Q1, employment continued to decrease at the level of the
national economy. However, most of those laid off did not
increase the number of unemployed, but rather exited the
labour market, mainly as a result of early retirement
triggered by poor future retirement prospects. Therefore,
free labour market capacities did not increase perceivably,
which may have contributed to the sustained intensity of
wage dynamics.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • UPDATE • AUGUST 200818
the beginning of 2007, which indicates that the wage increases
triggered an effective cost shock for them.
• Among those affected, manual workers also faced significant layoffs in
2007. This may also be indicative of the effective impact which the increase
of guaranteed minimum wages may have made as early as in 2007.
• While the increase in the guaranteed minimum wage in 2006 did not
produce a notable wage jump outside of businesses with 5-19
employees, its subsequent increases in 2007 and 2008 resulted in
clear-cut changes in the wages of larger companies as well. In view of
the fact that larger companies usually pay better wages, this may
suggest that the measure must have become more effective.
• Historically, unit labour cost and core inflation have moved in close
conjunction. If wage indices were distorted as a result of whitening, we
would expect a break in the historical relationship. By contrast, the
chart below suggests that our calculations regarding changes in unit
labour costs continue to be consistent with the inflation processes (see
Chart 1-27).
Chart 1-16
Changes in the number of employees of
companies with 5-249 and over 250 employees
(seasonally adjusted monthly data)
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Chart 1-17
Changes in the number of manual workers in the
private sector
(seasonally adjusted monthly data)
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Chart 1-18
Changes in the number of active workers and
employees*
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* In addition to the active population, the time series of extended activity
includes individuals among the inactive population who claim that they want
to work, even though they are not actively looking for a job at present. In our
experience, these individuals are much more connected to the labour market
than inactive individuals. Note: Source of data is CSO labour force statistics.
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According to the seasonally adjusted data of the Labour Force Survey
(LFS), from 2007 Q1 to 2008 Q1, the number of employed dropped by
60,000 individuals. When analysing the forces influencing wage
inflation, it is important to know what happened to those laid off and
how strongly connected they remain to the labour market. In this box,
based on the micro database of the LFS available up to March 2008, we
attempt to find an answer to this question.
In parallel with the decrease in employment, the number of
unemployed only increased by 15,000, while the number of inactive
individuals grew by 40,000 and the working-age population dropped
by 5,000. This data alone would not imply that the available workforce
has in fact decreased: in recent years, the activity rate in Hungary has
moved in very close conjunction with employment, even in
international comparison. This is largely due to the fact that there are
significant groups who claim that they intend to work even though they
are not actively looking for a job – and thus do not meet the criteria of
unemployment – nevertheless, employment data reveal that they are
relatively closely connected to the labour market.
In the past, the total number of active individuals supplemented with
those intending to work was less related to changes in employment
than the number of actives in itself – approximately as related as typical
for international data – and was probably a better indicator of the
effectively available workforce. The fact that this indicator currently
suggests a drop of approximately the same degree as activity is rather
pessimistic.
Government or local government jobs account for more than half of the
decrease in employment: compared to the previous year, employment
dropped by nearly 35,000 in this sector. The downsizing affected age
groups over 50 mostly. For all other age groups the share of employees
in government-related jobs basically remained unchanged.
Considering the typically inactive groups, it is noteworthy that parallel
to the decline in employment, especially at the end of 2007, the number
of those receiving old-age pensions under 75 grew considerably, by a
total of nearly 50,000. This growth is partly attributable to the aging of
the so-called ‘Ratkó generation’,11 and partly to the fact that many
people went into early retirement, most likely as a result of dismissals
and changes in pension regulations. The latter caused only a temporary
hike in the number of pensioners, and it is expected to be followed by a
drop in the number of new retirees in the near future. New retirees do
not all come from among those previously employed,12 therefore they
constitute only a part of those exiting the labour market.
In addition to early retirees, the number of those receiving various kinds
of benefits related to children (child care benefit, child care allowance
and child rearing allowance) also grew substantially, rising by 20,000.13
Box 1-3: To what extent did free labour market capacities grow in the last period?
Chart 1-19
Active population, active population including
those intending to work, employment
(annual data, based on the average of seasonally adjusted quarterly
data)
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Chart 1-20
Changes in the employment rate by gender and
age group
(2008 Q1, percentage change, year-on-year)
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11 The change in the age composition of the sample population would have increased the number of retirees by 16,000 in a year, excluding the changes of all other
relevant factors. 
12 In the most affected generations, the growth of the number of retirees is still higher than the fall in employment, even despite deaths. The fact that not all retirees
retire from jobs may account for this, and in addition, surveyors can reach retired persons more easily. This latter explanation is also supported by the fact that the
extraordinary growth in the number of pensioners exceeds the value indicated by the data of the Central Administration of National Pension Insurance.
13 Similar growth was observed in the number of children under 1, which means that, in contrast with previous experience, this time actually improving demographic
processes are behind the growth, instead of only an increase in the number of those receiving benefits. Although we cannot exclude sample-taking errors, birth
statistics also appear to indicate a slight improvement in demographic processes, which is presumably related to the Ratkó grandchildren starting families.
On the whole, the inflationary pressure from the labour
market at the beginning of the year has abated in the private
sector. This is because, despite the significant growth in
wage costs, companies faced slower growth in unit labour
costs than in the last quarter, due to improved
productivity.
15
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Changes in the employment rate according to gender and age group
again confirm that the decline in the number of employed is primarily
associated with the groups most affected by pension and benefits
related to children, i.e. individuals over 55 and women in their early
thirties. In addition, a significant decline (by nearly 3 percentage points)
can be observed in the age group 20-24.14 However, no growth could be
observed in the rate of unemployed or inactive individuals intending to
work in this age group. The change may be attributable to a process
that started in the past: the growing number of students in education
and delayed entry to the labour market. The ratio of students educated
in the school system is 1.5 percentage points higher in this group than
it was last year; however, their number is not substantially higher (only
by a few thousand individuals), as it is offset by the number of those
exiting the educational system.
On the whole, we can conclude that the decline in the number of
employed was accompanied by a similar decline in labour supply.
Therefore, there is no sign of a significant loosening in the labour
market or supply-side pressure triggering wage disinflation.
Although the decline in labour supply may be partly attributed to
temporary effects, since the increase of the retirement age has ended
and certain demographic changes took places (retirement of Ratkó
children, growth in the number of children), growth similar in size to
that of the last decade is not expected, even over the long run.
However, with respect to wage adjustments, the real question is:
what are the chances of the groups which became inactive due to the
unfavourable business conditions in the economy re-entering the
labour market in the next few years in the form of actual labour
supply.
Table 1-1
Summary of main changes*
Change compared
to the previous year
Population at the age of 15-74 (1+2) -5.6
Active population (1=1a+1b) -45.0
Employees (1a) -61.2
of which: government employment -34.3
Unemployed (1b) 16.2
Inactive population (2) 39.4
Pensioners 48.0
Receivers of child-care benefit 20.8
Active population+ inactive with the intention to work -48.3
* 2008 Q1, year-on-year change, thousand persons.
14 Although the CSO does not release the standard sample-taking error in its employment rate statistics broken down by gender and age group, based on estimates
for similar-size groups, we assume that it is around one-one and a half percentage points.
15 For the purposes of our analysis of the private sector’s productivity, agriculture is excluded, due to the volatile nature of the sector’s productivity.
1.4  SLOWLY DECREASING INFLATION
The consumer price index and core inflation remained high
in 2008 Q2. These data somewhat exceed the May
projection, but a slight decline was observed in trend
inflation, which is typically a better indicator of inflationary
processes.
16
In addition, as general inflationary pressure tended to grow
in most EU countries for consumer prices, the domestic
inflation level moved closer to the European average.
However, this slight convergence in inflation was due to the
relatively positive price developments in product groups not
included in core inflation, while no apparent convergence
was observed in the inflation index of the product group
making up core inflation.
Increasing international inflation trends are strongly
reflected in the continuing rise in imported commodity and
energy prices, and the steady double-digit rise in food prices.
Price increases could not have been observed thus far in the
import prices of product groups of complex products, such
as manufactured goods and machinery. Based on the
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16 The July inflation data did not reflect significantly decreasing inflation compared to the last few months; nevertheless, substantially lower prices of tradables clearly
reflect the impact of a much stronger EUR/HUF exchange rate than in previous months.
Chart 1-21
Changes in the unit labour cost and its components
in the private sector, excluding agriculture
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Chart 1-22
Inflation, core inflation and trend inflation*
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Chart 1-23
Harmonised index of consumer prices and core
inflation in Hungary and in the European Union*
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Chart 1-24
Changes in import prices by product group
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information available on Q2, there was a major surge in the
prices of energy, food and commodities. At the same time,
the appreciation of the EUR/HUF exchange rate which
began at the end of Q1 had a disinflationary effect on
imported inflation, but this only partially offset climbing
import prices.
Nevertheless, strongly rising energy prices may be clearly
reflected in the domestic production chain, and imply
continuously growing cost-push inflation. As the chart below
shows, this process has not yet peaked based on the previous
relationship between consumer and producer prices.
Thanks to improved productivity in the corporate sector, the
inflationary pressure from the labour market in the first half
of the year has abated somewhat, even though it still exceeds
the level consistent with the inflation target. Nevertheless,
from the perspective of economic activity, disinflationary
effects continue to remain strong, as companies are unable to
pass on all of their increased costs in sale prices, due to the
negative output gap.
Regarding the details of consumer prices, the higher-than-
expected inflation data is attributed mainly to the larger-
than-expected price increase for processed food, which is
probably a consequence of country-specific effects,
considering that the euro area has seen a marked deceleration
in this product group.
17
However, the price increase in
unprocessed food is slightly more favourable than our
projection, while prices of tradables are largely consistent
with our expectations.
In line with the projection in the May Report, over the past
six months services inflation has risen slightly above 6 per
cent, after remaining close to that level for a longer period.
This has been the result of opposing macroeconomic forces:
higher energy and food prices as well as wage costs, on the
one hand, and weak household demand, on the other.
A closer look at the different product groups within market
services reveals that this rise in inflation has been related
mainly to two services groups: food-intensive and fuel-
intensive service industries.
18
Inflation in these two groups
has picked up steadily since 2006 and early 2007,
respectively, as food and vehicle fuel prices, rising sharply
over the recent period, account for a large share of their cost
structure. The percentage share of the two product groups
within market services is only around 15 per cent. Inflation
in the rest of market services, accounting for a 85 per cent
share, has remained unchanged over the past six months.
Price movements in this product group are generally less
volatile: average inflation has been around 6 per cent in the
past three years. On balance, weak household demand in
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Chart 1-26
Trend inflation, unit labour cost and the output gap
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Chart 1-25
Ripple effect of energy shocks in the economy
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17 Mainly inflation in milk and dairy product prices contributed to the high index of processed foods. Nevertheless, the analyses point to an adjustment in the case of
this product group for the autumn, since the market of milk can be characterised by oversupply in the whole of Europe. The inflation of processed food, which is more
unfavourable than the international figures, may be caused on the whole by an increase in energy costs, which was larger than it could be observed in international
trends.
18 Food-intensive services include ‘meals at restaurants not by subscription’, ‘meals at canteens and meals by subscription’, ‘buffet products’ and ‘cup of coffee in
catering’. Fuel-intensive services include ‘taxi’ and ‘transport of goods’. Inflation in these aggregate service industries has been derived as the weighted average of
price changes in the individual industries.
recent years has not yet broken this inflation inertia in any of
the product groups within market services.
In the third quarter, the inflation level perceived and
expected by households increased, which may increase the
risk of consumption inflation remaining at high levels. On the
other hand, all of the conclusions based on the household
poll are rendered less reliable by the fact that the rising trend
of perceived inflation has diverged from the falling trend of
actual inflation since mid-2007.
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Chart 1-27
Market services inflation*
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Ja
n
. 
0
2
Ju
ly
 0
2
Ja
n
. 
0
3
Ju
ly
 0
3
Ja
n
. 
0
4
Ju
ly
 0
4
Ja
n
. 
0
5
Ju
ly
 0
5
Ja
n
. 
0
6
Ju
ly
 0
6
Ja
n
. 
0
7
Ju
ly
 0
7
Ja
n
. 
0
8
Ju
ly
 0
8
Per cent
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Per cent
Food-intensive industries Fuel-intensive industries
Other industries Market services
* After eliminating the effects of changes in indirect taxes as well as the
introduction and abolition of medical visit fees.
Chart 1-28
Households’ inflation perception for the last 
12 months, and expectations for the next 12 months
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Between March and May 2008, the Monetary Council raised
the central bank base rate in three steps by a total of 100 basis
points. Monetary tightening was the Council’s response to
the effect of global oil, food and other commodity prices on
the inflation outlook and the risks arising from potentially
elevated inflationary expectations. In June and July, the
central bank left the base rate unchanged, as it found
monetary conditions tight enough for the inflation target to
be met over the relevant time horizon.
Tightened monetary conditions were the combined outcome
of a higher base rate and a significantly stronger EUR/HUF
exchange rate. The July average exchange rate used in the
baseline scenario in the inflation forecast is approximately 9
per cent stronger relative to early 2008; and 13 per cent
compared to the low in March (Chart 2-1).
Monetary tightening was mainly reflected in the appreciation
of the CPI-based real exchange rate, which rose nearly 10 per
cent between March and June (Chart 2-2). The rate of
appreciation of the real exchange rate was faster than the
average rate experienced over recent years. Although the
forward-looking 1-year real interest rate is higher than in
2007, it is only slightly above its historic average. This is
attributable to the fact that a significant rise in nominal
interest rates was accompanied by a deteriorating inflation
outlook.
2.1  APPRECIATION OF THE FORINT
ATTRIBUTABLE TO BOTH DOMESTIC 
AND GLOBAL FACTORS
The improving international perception of Hungary’s
economy and positive international sentiment regarding
emerging market currencies have contributed to a stronger
forint. The equilibrium situation has been improving since
2006. The credibility of monetary policy has also improved
since the abandonment of the fluctuation band, partly due to
increases in the policy rate, which reflected in changes in the
long-term exchange rate expectations as well. Investors
previously either treated Hungary similarly to high-risk
Baltic States and the Balkans, both ridden with imbalances,
or to countries in the region, rapidly converging to the euro
area. Although economic growth is still low and inflation is
high, the country’s relative indicators have improved
considerably since 2007 relative to other countries in the
region. GDP growth is accelerating in Hungary, while a
slowdown is expected in the other new EU member states,
and the difference in inflation has also moderated. Based on
what has been experienced in the last few months, investors
are beginning to acknowledge this relative improvement,
which is reflected in a stronger exchange rate and the fact
that the CDS premium of Hungary has become lower over
the past months than that of the riskiest countries.
Furthermore, foreign investors have again been net buyers of
government securities over the past few weeks, and there has
been a reduction in the difference between long-term yields
on government securities in Hungary and those in the euro
area.
The appreciation of the forint, along with that of other
currencies in the region and the developing markets,
unprecedentedly took place against the backdrop of
increasingly poor market sentiment and dwindling risk
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2  Financial markets
Chart 2-1
Changes in the EUR/HUF exchange rate
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tolerance. The global investor climate started to improve in
March, simultaneously with the bail-out of Bear Stearns.
However, this trend ended in May, with the optimistic
sentiment gradually turning bleaker. The first negative shock
was caused by heightened concerns about higher inflation in
response to soaring oil prices. The traded price of WTI crude
oil exceeded USD 130 a barrel, which drove yields up. Partly
due to central bank communication, investors temporarily
included the possibility of a tightening cycle involving both the
Fed and the ECB in their expectations. A second wave of
shocks resulting in deteriorating investor sentiment was caused
by a new crisis in the US sub-prime market. In July, state-
subsidised US agencies engaged in the refinancing of mortgage
loans turned out to be on the brink of bankruptcy.
While financial instrument prices in developed markets and
high interest currencies moved in close conjunction, i.e.
weaker risk tolerance led to the liquidation of positions in
high interest currencies and the depreciation of exchange
rates, the past few weeks have seen a reversal of this
correlation, i.e. high interest currencies, with the exception
of the Icelandic crown, have appreciated despite the
turbulence in the developed markets and falling equity
market prices. The currencies of certain emerging countries
seem to hold an appeal for a number of investors in an
environment characterised by low returns in developed
markets and falling share prices. This requires an assumption
on the investors’ part that the central banks of these countries
will not allow their currencies to depreciate, despite
deteriorating growth prospects.
The most recent analyst surveys suggest a shift in long-term
currency expectations towards the appreciation of the forint.
Option market quotations suggest that, although market
participants’ exchange rate expectations vary, they are mostly
symmetric at the current exchange rate. The decline in non-
residents’ HUF positions reversed in March and since then
their HUF exposure has risen by HUF 700 billion. This
suggests that non-residents are quite willing to open HUF
positions, despite the fact that short-term yields have
dropped significantly over the past few weeks. By contrast,
there has been an upsurge in households’ FX deposits over
the past few months, and corporations also seem to prefer
HUF loans to FX-denominated ones, which suggests that
domestic participants are not convinced that the current
exchange rate, stronger than it used to be, will persist.
2.2  DOMESTIC YIELDS INFLUENCED 
BY FALLING EURO YIELDS AND
MODERATING SPREADS
The Fed left the federal funds rate unchanged during the
period under review. Against the backdrop of a dismal
economic outlook, the CPI rose to 5 per cent in the USA,
reaching a 17-year high. Despite the prevailing inflationary
pressure, interest rates only partially price in a rate hike by
the end of the year, which can be attributed in part to a wide
output gap, and in part to risks to financial stability.
Due to the disappointing growth and activity data published
in the euro area in the past few weeks, coupled with a more
relaxed central bank tone, investors are anticipating an
unchanged base rate over the short run and a rate cut within
a one-year period. For quite some time, it seemed that the
sub-prime crisis would impact euro area countries less
severely than the USA; however, the latest indicators point to
a significant slowdown in economic activity. Furthermore,
the banking sector in Europe has also incurred substantial
losses in connection with sub-prime lending. Consequently,
tighter lending standards have also hit the European
economies hard. To make things worse, rising oil prices have
created a negative supply shock. Due to these factors, the
European Central Bank (ECB) significantly revised down its
forecast for economic growth. In May, the ECB’s
communication took on a much stricter tone, prompting
investors to price in several rate hikes for the coming months.
Although the ECB did raise its key policy rate to 4.25 per
cent, it did not provide any indications of further tightening,
which, in turn, triggered a significant fall in yields despite the
fact that inflation in the euro area reached all-time high in
June and July (4 per cent).
Despite weaker risk tolerance on the global scale the
improved perception of emerging markets reflected in yield
premia as well. The previous trend of interest premia on
emerging sovereign FX bonds and the CDS premia of
investment banks rising in tandem was interrupted last
month, and risk premia on a few emerging markets could
moderate. We are witnessing a similar trend in the market of
HUF-denominated government securities. Although premia,
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Chart 2-3
5-year spread on CDS in certain emerging countries
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relative to yields on German government securities, have
reached an all-time high in the euro area, premia in the
region have declined. Given that yields in Germany also
diminished in the meantime, this represents a significant drop
in yields.
The past three months have witnessed an 80-100 basis point
fall in the Hungarian government securities and swap market
along the entire length of the yield curve. Rising yields in the
euro area, as well as higher-than-expected inflation and wage
data were able to trigger a marked rise in June and the market
priced in several rate hikes. However, as the Monetary
Council left its key policy rate unchanged in June, and the
ECB adopted a neutral communication strategy following its
rate hike in June, yields in both the euro area and in Hungary
dropped. Non-resident buyers emerged in the Hungarian
government securities market. The success of the bond
auctions held by the Government Debt Management Agency
encouraged buyers to stock up. The 5x5 forward yield spread
calculated on the basis of interest rate swap yields has also
improved over recent weeks. For the time being, however,
even a surge in non-residents’ purchases of government
securities has proven insufficient to generate a lasting
improvement in liquidity, which had deteriorated
significantly in March.
The strengthening of the forint over recent months, inflation
data below market consensus and oil prices declining over the
past few weeks have combined to smooth out the path of the
central bank base rate implied in financial market yields
(Chart 2-4). Currently, the market is not anticipating further
rate hikes. For the end of the year, financial market yields are
consistent with a 8.25 per cent base rate. Recent analyst
surveys also agree on end-2008 or early-2009 as the most
likely date for the first rate cut.
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Chart 2-4
Expectations concerning the MNB’s key policy rate
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The August issue of the Report projects slow disinflation,
provided that our base assumptions (the most important of
which are an exchange rate of EUR/HUF 232 and oil prices of
around USD 137) hold true. Consumer prices stand to increase
by 4 per cent in 2009 and by 3 per cent in 2010. We anticipate
a moderate economic upturn, with the growth rate only likely
to catch up with its potential in 2010. As a result, the output
gap will remain negative over the entire forecast horizon.
19
3.1  SLOW UPTURN IN ECONOMIC
GROWTH
Our projection forecasts a sluggish economic upturn over the
entire projection horizon. Net exports will play a less
important role in this upturn. Internal demand may, by
contrast, pick up. As the growth rate is unlikely to catch up
with the rate of growth in economic capacities before 2010,
the output gap will remain negative over the entire forecast
horizon and be wider than projected in May. Although in the
short run, slacker-than-expected external business activity
and moderate domestic consumption may be offset by robust
agricultural performance, our long-term outlook for growth
is much bleaker compared to the May Report. A less
favourable external business cycle and a strong forint jointly
reduce the contribution of net exports to growth. Steadily
high oil prices and the decrease in employment are also an
obstacle to more vigorous domestic consumption.
It is mainly the deteriorating outlook for economic growth
in developed economies that affects export growth most
strongly. Fundamentally, this is mainly due to the spill-over
effect of the sub-prime crisis, high energy prices and the
impact of the stronger euro exchange rate in the euro area.
Furthermore, exports may also be hit hard by the exchange
rate of the forint appreciating vis-à-vis the euro. The fact
that converging countries in the region with a higher
growth rate than in the euro area have come to represent an
increasingly large weight in Hungarian exports and that,
similarly to the forint, the national currencies of Hungary’s
neighbouring countries also strengthened compared to the
euro may help to mitigate the above trends. Taking these
factors into consideration, we revise our projection for
external demand and net exports downward compared to
our projection in May.
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3  Outlook for inflation and the real economy
Compared to May 2008, our current central projections have changed
significantly. First of all, USD-denominated oil futures prices have risen
by approximately 30 per cent over the entire forecast horizon. Second,
the forint has appreciated against the euro by close to 9 per cent. The
above two effects will strongly influence expected macro-economic
developments. High oil prices push up inflation and restrain growth at
the same time . A stronger exchange rate leads to faster disinflation, but
comes at the price of temporarily slower economic growth.
Box 3-1: Changes in the central projection
Table 3-1
Changes in our main projections relative to the May Report*
May 2008 August 2008 Change compared with May
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
Central bank base rate
(per cent)** 8.25 8.25 8.25 8.5 8.5 8.5 0.25 0.25 0.25
HUF/EUR 255.2 253.8 253.8 242.8 231.9 231.9 -4.9 -8.6 -8.6
USD/EUR (cent) 155.7 157.6 157.6 155.4 157.7 157.7 -0.2 0.1 0.1
BRENT oil price (USD/barrel) 106.4 106.3 103.8 122.4 138.2 137.1 15.1 30.0 32.1
BRENT oil price (HUF/barrel) 17,415 17,113 16,722 18,974 20,324 20,168 9.0 18.8 20.6
* Annual averages, based on the average exchange rate and the oil futures price trajectory in July 2008.
** End-of-the-year values, based on our average July assumption.
19 The projections were prepared on the basis of information available up to the 15th of August.
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The exchange rate of the forint appreciated significantly in the last
quarter, leaving behind the strong edge of the previous intervention
band. As an exchange rate stronger than EUR/HUF 240 has never
persisted for a longer period of time, it will be highly informative to see
the macro-economic effects triggered by a permanently strong forint
on the economy.
We used the central bank’s model for quarterly projection (Hungarian
abbreviation: NEM) for the analysis. NEM is a standard macro-economic
tool that can capture economic interconnections simultaneously.20
Although the finalised baseline scenario of the Reports is an expert
projection incorporating the results of a number of models, NEM
remains one of the most important inputs for making forecasts.
Through what channels does exchange rate appreciation exert its
influence in the NEM model?
A stronger exchange rate changes the relative price of both domestic
and foreign goods, which, in turn, triggers adjustment mechanisms in
the commodity and labour markets. In the long term, changes in the
exchange rate do not have any impact on the real economy in the
model, because output depends on the quantity of available labour and
capital, and the level of available technology, all of which can be derived
from the structural characteristics of the economy.21
For Hungary, as a small, open, price-taking economy, exchange rate
appreciation renders domestic imports, quantified in forints, cheaper
and reduces export prices. This incurs net income losses for the foreign
trade sector, i.e. economic growth slows down. Inflation is mitigated
indirectly by slower growth and directly by a stronger exchange rate.
Data suggest that wages are rigid, and consequently lower inflation
results in a temporary increase in real wages. A drop in economic
activity and rising real wages jointly lead to weaker labour demand
growth on the corporate side, which in turn results in a lower rate of
employment. A lower rate of employment leads to excess supply in the
labour market, resulting in wage adjustment in the long run. By the time
the adjustment process is over, the decrease in nominal wages will have
become identical to that in prices, i.e. no change will have occurred in
real wages. However, the increase in real wages temporarily boosts
consumption, which mitigates the adverse impact of negative trends in
foreign trade.
Changes in investments are an interesting issue. A slower business cycle
also affects investment; nevertheless, changes in the cost of capital
show a mixed picture. Depending on the cause of the exchange rate
appreciation, the cost of capital may either rise or fall. If the cause is
monetary tightening, real interest rate and the cost of capital increase,
which in turn, discourages investments. If the cause is a drop in the risk
premium, the real interest rate falls, which boosts investments.
Our simulation assumes a 5 per cent appreciation in the exchange rate;
for the sake of simplicity and for the purposes of this model, we assume
the shock to be exogenous from the perspective of the model, i.e. the
central bank base rate remains unchanged.
Two remarks of technical nature must also be made. As NEM does not
model energy producer costs, the impact of such costs is inputed from
our cost-based model. The underlying reason for this is that the two
major cost components of production are wages and energy. The latter
mostly depends on global market trends and, hence, the exchange rate.
Cheaper imported energy impacts both administered prices and
vehicle fuel prices. The impact of the latter has been quantified on the
basis of expert estimates.
The chart and the table below reveal that exchange rate appreciation
affects inflation more strongly than growth. The primary reason for this
is the high import content of consumption and production.
Furthermore, as has been noted, the adverse effect of the exchange rate
appreciation is cushioned by a temporary rise in real wages and the
resultant increase in household consumption. There is also a temporary
Box 3-2: How does the Hungarian economy respond to nominal exchange rate appreciation? Simulations
with the NEM model
20 For details, see Benk et al. (2006): “The Quarterly Projection Model (NEM)”, MNB Occasional Papers 60.
21 For a detailed discussion of the topic, see Jakab–Kovács (2003): “Determinants of the Exchange Rate Pass -Through: Simulations with the NIGEM Model”, MNB Working
Papers 2003/5.
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In contrast to net exports, the internal factors of the economy
are expected to pick up. Household consumption demand is
likely to grow stronger gradually, but over the entire forecast
horizon, it will fall behind the average growth rate seen in the
past ten years. The main underlying reason for this is
moderate growth in free disposable real income, for which we
have revised our projection downward relative to May.
23
A lower rate of employment, slow disinflation and, due to the
sub-prime crisis, increasingly tight credit conditions in the
long run may reinforce households’ willingness to save.
Similarly to consumer spending, investment is expected to
pick up. Nonetheless, its rate will remain relatively weak over
the entire forecast horizon. Investment, however, varies from
one sector to the next. Corporate investment in sectors
producing mostly for the domestic markets, due to the more
pronounced domestic content of growth, is likely to become
more robust, while by contrast, manufacturing investment
may slow down. Due to the combined effect of these two
conflicting factors, our projection calls for faster growth in
2009 and somewhat slower growth in 2010 compared to the
May forecast. On the one hand, we envisage moderate
investment growth because of a less positive external business
cycle and slower domestic growth. On the other hand,
unique, previously unparalleled high value manufacturing
investment will flow into Hungary. Therefore, on the whole,
they will have a palpable effect on investment dynamics.
24
Government investment is also expected to grow,
predominantly due to EU funds.
25
Regarding the willingness
of households to invest, slow and increasingly uncertain
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halt in investments, which is in part due to a general economic
downturn, and in part to the fact that as interest rates do not change in
the model and as inflation decreases, the real interest rate increases.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the model simulation cannot handle
one major channel of the transmission mechanism of the exchange rate
appreciation, namely the one linked to the fact that FX lending has
gained ground. In 2007, the aggregate open FX position of non-
financial corporations and households run into 30 per cent of GDP. 
A stronger exchange rate may, through this channel and in the short
run, boost growth and interfere with disinflation due to wealth
accumulation.22 We would also like to point out that exchange rate
appreciation does not change real wealth in the long run, as a reduction
in domestic prices does not affect the real exchange rate.
22 Estimates reveal that nearly half of overall consumption is financed from wealth. A 5 per cent exchange rate appreciation increases FX-denominated wealth to an
extent that is equal to 1.5 per cent of income. This may be accompanied by a 0.7 per cent change in consumption, according to best-case-scenario estimates.
Although reducing disinflation, this can be expressed in decimals at the most.
23 Our projection is based on the assumption that household consumption expenses will, as a proportion of their disposable income, fall by 1 percentage point from
the current 90 per cent. If the impact of a start-of-the-year reduction in money market wealth runs deeper than we expected it to, the rate of consumption discussed
above may also be lower. This alone should generate slower economic growth and inflation.
24 Scheduled to commence in 2009, the Mercedes investment in Kecskemét is by far the most important investment. As no detailed information is available yet, our
assumption is that investment will be implemented in two identical portions in 2009 and 2010. It will affect annual indices in a manner that in 2009 their value will
grow compared to what was assumed earlier; in 2010, however, given that by that time preceding year’s increase will have been incorporated into the base, it will be
unchanged.
25 Temporarily, government investment may well exceed our expectations, as investment planned earlier may, due to delays so far, take shorter to be completed in the
years to come.
Table 3-2
Changes in the growth of main macro-economic aggregates triggered by a permanent, 5 per cent
nominal exchange rate appreciation 
Annual average effect in percentage points First year Second year
Consumer prices -0.5 -0.9
Price index of core inflation -0.4 -1.0
GDP -0.2 -0.2
Consumer expenditure 0.3 0.9
Gross fixed capital formation -0.1 -0.3
Export -0.1 -0.5
Import 0.2 -0.1
Private sector wage 0.0 -0.3
Private sector employment 0.0 -0.2
Household’s real disposable income 0.4 0.7
growth in real wages suggest that the current downturn will
take long to reverse.
Overall, as a combined effect of both external and internal
factors, we have revised our May projection regarding the
pace of economic upturn, downward. There is considerable
uncertainty about the extent of the slowdown in the external
business cycle and the robustness of a possible reversal in
internal demand.
3.2  WEAKER LABOUR DEMAND,
MODERATELY DECREASING WAGE
DYNAMICS
The profitability of the private sector has deteriorated over
the past year, due initially to fiscal adjustments and then to
rising energy prices and a series of raises in the minimum
wage for skilled labour. Our projection continues to be based
on the assumption that companies will compensate for the
ensuing loss of profit through layoffs, reduced wages and
increased prices.
We expect quantitative adjustment to be a dominant
strategy for improving profitability over the forecast
horizon. The reason for this is that the negative output gap
prevents any significant rise in prices. Inflation, which is
higher than we expected, also fuels employees’ demand for
raises in nominal wages, thus hindering a stronger decrease
in wage growth.
Compared to May, companies are facing a steady fall in
profitability due to weaker external and internal demand,
and the stronger forint exchange rate. Corporate
adjustment in the labour market takes place through
layoffs, even more markedly than in May, while our
forecast for development in real wage growth has not
changed significantly.
3.3  STEADY DISINFLATION
Our central projection is that inflation will decrease at a
steady rate, from the current level of close to 7 per cent to
about 3 per cent by the end of 2010. We expect that the
current price indices will have decreased in all major
groups of goods by the end of the forecast period, i.e.
there will be widespread disinflation. The negative output
gap, which forces companies to check wage outflows and
show more moderation in increasing prices than in the
past, will continue playing a prominent role. Commodity
prices are unlikely to increase further over the forecast
horizon.
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Chart 3-2
Contribution of individual factors to GDP growth
(based on annual changes)
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Chart 3-3
Components of unit labour cost in the private sector
(quarterly data, annual changes)
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Inflation averaged around 3 per cent in 2006 H1 and started to rise from
the second half of the year, essentially due to fiscal adjustments. Our
projection at the time was for stronger disinflation once the temporary
shock caused by the austerity measures had worn off. Currently
available date suggest that inflation is stagnating near 7 per cent. This
box discusses the reasons why lower inflation has failed to materialise,
contrary to our expectations.
In order to be able to analyse this issue, using the results of a cost-based
model of inflation, we broke down the difference between the inflation
projection in November 2006, actual inflation in 2007 and the current
projection for 200826 according to the effects of various explanatory
variables (see table below). The explanatory variables are: oil prices and
agricultural producer prices (jointly: commodity prices), the HUF/EUR
exchange rate, unit labour costs, administrative regulations and profit
margins. Chart 3-4. below plots the changes in the path of oil and
agricultural prices, and the exchange rate of the forint. The aim of the
analysis is to establish the extent to which the above variables can
explain the differences between the projected inflation (which was
given in 2006), actual inflation in 2007 and the current (2008)
projection. The portion that cannot be explained with the above
variables represents the impact of inflationary labour market pressures
and changes in profit, both depending to a large extent on the
prevailing business cycle and the output gap. If the latter factors
provide a strong explanation, it suggests that we were mistaken in
assessing the impact of the negative output gap on disinflation.
For the purpose of the simulation, 2007 and 2008 should be analysed
separately. Compared to our projection in November 2006, actual
inflation in 2007 was pushed up significantly by agricultural producer
prices. Oil prices reduced inflation slightly and the HUF/EUR exchange
rate exerted a marked downward impact. Thus, the combined effect of
commodity prices and the exchange rate was neutral. With the impact
of changes in oil prices and the exchange rate filtered out, administered
prices rose more sharply than expected, accounting for most of the
difference between actual and projected inflation. The impact of
administrative regulations included the introduction of medical visit
fees, which also added to inflation in 2007 in a manner that could not
have been foreseen. Our projection for inflationary labour market
pressures was accurate in November 2006, as the labour market impact
translated into a mere -0.1 percentage point, while the profit margin
had a stronger impact at -0.3 percentage points. The above suggests
that the majority of the differences in 2007 are not attributable to the
erroneous projection for business cycle trends.
Box 3-3: Why has there been no marked disinflation since early 2007, i.e. does a sluggish economy affect
inflation trends?
Table 3-3
Breakdown of differences between the projection in November 2006 and actual inflation in 2007/
inflation projected for 2008, all figures in percentage points
2007 2008
Forecast in November 2006 6.9 4.1
Actual / projection in August 2008 8.0 6.3
Difference 1.1 2.2
Effect of explaining variables
Oil (in euro) -0.1 2.1
Agricultural producer price 0.7 1.4
Prices of raw materials, total 0.6 3.5
Exchange rate (HUF/EUR) -0.6 -1.1
Regulated prices without household energy 0.6 0.3
Household energy (without the effect of oil and exchange rate) 0.4 -0.4
Producers’ energy prices (without the effect of oil and exchange rate) 0.3 0.1
Medical visit fee 0.2 -0.2
Regulatory decisions, total 1.5 -0.2
Unit labour cost -0.1 0.3
Profit margin -0.3 -0.3
26 As a CPI index for seven months in 2008 is available, an estimate of the annual average with an error of some tenths of percentage points can already be provided.
Therefore, we proceed as if actual data for 2008 were already available.
We expect agricultural commodity prices, which started to
decrease in 2008 Q2, to continue declining until the end of
the year, as favourable regional harvests this year will play
crucial role in this regard. Due to slow adjustment in global
supply, our assumption for 2009 for agricultural
commodity prices is to exceed average inflation.
27
Unlike
agricultural prices, energy prices generate inflation at the
start of the forecasting horizon, based on our central
projection. In the second half of 2010, their influence will
be neutral.
Overall, the above factors will lead to lower core inflation
over the entire forecast horizon. The rate of disinflation may
be more robust, than it was projected in May since the impact
of our forint exchange rate assumption will exert the effect ot
the record-high energy prices.
Commodities influence not only core inflation, but also the
price of goods outside of core inflation. The declining
prices of agricultural commodities, a trend that started in
2008 Q2, will generate a similar reduction in the price of
unprocessed food before the end of 2008. By contrast, from
early 2009, the price of agricultural commodities will rise
more sharply than inflation. As a result, from end-2009,
unprocessed food will be the product group where prices
will rise the sharpest. Energy prices will generate a marked
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Commodity prices have played a key role in inflation in 2008. Oil and
agricultural producer prices have caused a 3.5 percentage point shift,
which the HUF/EUR exchange rate has mitigated somewhat, by 1.1
percentage point. Thus, they jointly account for a 2.4 percentage point
difference. The fact that administrative regulations have brought about
lower-than-expected inflation seems surprising at first. The reason for
this phenomenon is that the medical visit fee was abolished and
regulated energy prices have so far been raised to a smaller extent than
justified by changes in import prices. In the case of producers’ energy
prices, the latter has been offset by the transformation of the electricity
market. Due to the impact of the labour market on inflation, we have
revised our projection upwards for 2008 by 0.3 percentage points; the
higher-than-expected impact of the profit margin amounted to -0.3
percentage points. The above suggests that in 2008 as well, higher-
than-expected inflation is fundamentally attributable to trends other
than those emerging from an unexpected business cycle situation
affecting the Hungarian economy.
Overall, on the basis of our cost-based model, it seems that the reason
that disinflation expected since 2006 has failed to materialise so far can
found in the unexpected rises in commodity and regulated prices. The
way in which the impact of slower domestic growth differs from what
has been expected offers no explanation. There are two more issues
worth mentioning. One is that the impact of the labour market obscures
the fact that the wage increase was 1.5–2 percentage points higher
than expected in both 2007 and 2008. This is due to a stronger-than-
anticipated effect of the raise in the minimum wage for skilled workers
and slower disinflation, to which corporations adjusted through layoffs.
The responses of the labour market have been rather different from our
expectations; however, their impact on inflation is almost negligible.
The other issue is that, according to the logic of the cost-based model,
any potential error in the operation of the model leads to changes in the
profit margin. This means that if the model overestimates the impact of
higher costs, such overestimation will result in a tighter profit margin in
the decomposition.
Chart 3-4
Changes in our assumptions for oil prices,
agricultural producer prices* and the HUF/EUR
exchange rate in November 2006 and August
2008
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* Aggregate of agricultural producer prices that are used in our model.
27 Poor weather in 2007 only partly accounts for recent food price inflation. The increasing popularity of biofuels - which reduce agricultural land available for food
production - and strong demand for food in emerging countries have played an equally important role. At the time our projection was formulated, we assumed that
excessive demand in the food market will continue in the coming years, albeit at a more moderate pace than in 2007.
increase in the price of vehicle fuels and market energy and,
in all likelihood, the regulated price of household energy in
the next one and a half year. In 2010, however, they will
not add to inflation.
28
Relative to the projection in May, our inflation projection
does not change significantly, which is the outcome of two
contradictory effects. The rise in commodity prices increases
inflation, but this is offset by a stronger forint and slower
economic growth.
3.4  ALTERNATIVE MACRO-ECONOMIC
SCENARIOS
As a negative output gap and the related slowdown in wages
are key components of the inflation projection in the baseline
scenario, two of our risk scenarios address the
interconnections in detail.
As discussed in detail in Box 1-3, in recent quarters, the
majority of those who lost their jobs left the labour market
permanently. Therefore, we analysed the outcome of a
scenario where labour supply, i.e. the rate of activity is
consistently lower than is projected in the baseline scenario.
In such a scenario, the potential growth rate of the economy
is also lower, which in turn reduces the actual rate of
growth in the long run. In addition, a tight labour market
represents an upside risk to inflation, and thus, inflation
would be 0.5 percentage point higher than in the baseline
scenario.
In the other scenario, economic participants adjust to recent
high inflation in their wage decisions to a larger extent than
in the baseline scenario. Among the risk scenarios, this would
mean the greatest departure from the baseline scenario, as in
this scenario, inflation would be over 1 per cent higher, i.e. it
would also leave the ±1 tolerance band around the inflation
target. Simultaneously, due to the fact that higher inflation
reduces real wages, economic growth would also fall behind
what is projected in the baseline scenario.
Developments in commodity prices are the source of much
uncertainty in terms of inflation. As there has been significant
adjustment in the high oil prices in recent weeks, we wish to
reiterate the resultant disinflation impact that is stronger than
under the baseline scenario.
29
If oil prices were to remain at
USD 115 per barrel, then together with the validity of other
baseline assumptions, inflation would be close to 3 per cent
in mid-2009.
The main underlying reason for the adjustment in oil prices
was the deterioration in outlook for growth. Alternative
scenario 4 tackles the latter possibility. This scenario is the
most important one concerning the impact on GDP growth.
It assumes a more significant slowdown in Europe, which is
identical to what was experienced in 2001 and 2002,
compared to the baseline scenario. If this scenario
materialises, domestic economic growth will be consistently
lower than in the baseline scenario until mid-2010. Inflation
would also be weaker, nearly 0.5 percentage point lower at
end-2010.
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28 The length of time during which the price of imported energy passes through into the regulated price of household energy is partly an economic policy issue. At the
time of preparing our projection, we relied on the assumption that the higher price of imported energy will have passed through into those of household energy
gradually, but completely by mid-2009.
29 At the cut-off date for the data used in the Report the spot price of crude oil was approx. USD 114 a barrel as opposed to the USD 137 a barrel on which our baseline
projection was based.
* For technical reasons, this indicator may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the long term, however, it follows a similar
trend.
Weight 2008 2009 2010
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Unprocessed food 5.8 13.8 11.3 3.5 -3.5 -3.6 -2.8 0.7 4.0 5.5 5.9 5.7 5.2
Vehicle fuel and market energy 7.1 14.8 13.3 12.2 9.4 7.9 4.1 3.3 2.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Regulated prices 21.1 6.9 7.1 8.6 10.3 10.1 9.7 8.8 7.6 5.7 4.7 3.8 3.0
Core inflation* 66.0 5.6 5.6 5.0 4.1 3.4 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7
Consumer price index 100.0 6.9 6.8 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.7
Table 3-4
Detailed baseline scenario of inflation
3.5  NEAR SYMMETRIC RISKS 
TO INFLATION, DOWNSIDE RISKS TO
GROWTH OUTLOOK
Overall, based on the above scenarios, risks to the baseline
scenario of inflation are nearly symmetrical, which arises
from the contrasting impacts of the different scenarios. While
the risks of a potential steady decline in labour supply and the
backward-looking nature of inflation expectations are on the
upside, risks associated with steadily lower commodity prices
and weaker European growth are on the downside.
By contrast, regarding economic growth, risk scenarios point
to adverse trends, i.e. growth will be slower over the entire
forecast horizon than in the baseline scenario. The most
important contributing factor is that external demand is
projected to be weaker than assumed in the baseline scenario.
3.6  IMPROVING EXTERNAL BALANCE,
BUT RISKS OF A HIGHER DEFICIT
In line with our earlier projection, external imbalances
continued to decline in 2008 H1. The consolidated general
government deficit has been decreasing along the projected
path, and has remained the most important domestic
component of declining external financing requirement.
However, no turning point has so far been seen in
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Chart 3-5
Inflation impact of alternative scenarios
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Chart 3-6
Growth impact of alternative scenarios
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Chart 3-7
Inflation projection fan chart*
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* The fan chart represents the uncertainty surrounding the central
projection. The shaded areas portray the central 90 per cent probability
distribution in total. The central, darkest area containing the central
projection for the consumer price index (as the mode of distribution)
indicated by the white dashed line portrays 30 per cent of the probability
distribution.
Chart 3-8
GDP fan chart*
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* The fan chart represents the uncertainty surrounding the central
projection. The shaded areas portray the central 90 per cent of probability
distribution in total. The central, darkest area containing the central
projection for the GDP (as the mode of distribution) indicated by the white
dashed line portray 30 per cent of the probability distribution.
household savings. The sector’s GDP-proportionate
financing capacity declined further in the first part of the
year. This suggests that household savings may, even with
the emergence of an anticipated turning point, fall short of
the figure indicated in the Quarterly Report on Inflation in
May. The deteriorating external demand projection and
the stronger assumption of the HUF/EUR rate compared to
May also point toward a higher external deficit forecast.
However these effects are supressed by a declining
repatriated income of the foreign-owned export sector.
Overall, we maintain our earlier projection for the external
financing requirement, but due due to the factors
mentioned above, we have detected upside risks compared
to our latest projection.
OUTLOOK FOR INFLATION AND THE REAL ECONOMY
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • UPDATE • AUGUST 2008 35
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • UPDATE • AUGUST 200836
2007 2008 2009 2010
Actual Projection
May Current May Current May Current
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 6.0 5.1 5.1 3.7 2.8 3.0 2.7
Consumer price index 8.0 6.3 6.3 4.2 4.1 3.0 3.0
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based)* 3.9 2.5 2.5 2.3 1.9 2.3 2.1
Impact of fiscal demand2 -3.6 -1.5 ↔ -0.1 ↔ -0.8 ↔
Household consumption -1.9 0.3 0.3 1.6 1.4 3.1 2.8
Memo: Household consumption expenditure -0.3 0.6 0.6 1.8 1.5 3.1 2.7
Fixed capital formation 0.1 3.2 2.1 5.1 5.4 6.8 6.3
Domestic absorption -0.4 1.3 1.0 2.9 2.5 3.8 3.4
Export 14.2 10.8 10.1 9.4 7.4 10.6 8.7
Import3 12.0 9.8 8.8 9.3 7.5 11.0 8.9
GDP** 1.3 2.2 (2.4) 2.2 (2.4) 3.2 (3.0) 2.6 (2.4) 3.7 3.4
Current account deficit3
As a percentage of GDP 5.0 4.9 ↑ 4.8 ↑ 4.8 ↑
EUR billions 5.1 5.3 ↑ 5.5 ↑ 6.0 ↑
External financing requirement3
As a percentage of GDP 4.0 3.4 ↑ 2.8 ↑ 2.5 ↑
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4 8.0 8.8 8.8 6.5 6.5 6.7 6.5
Whole-economy employment5 -0.1 -1.4 -1.6 0.1 -0.6 0.4 0.1
Private sector gross average earnings6 9.1 (8.2) 9.0 (8.2) 10.2 (8.5) 7.2 7.2 6.8 6.5
Private sector employment5 0.9 -1.1 -1.7 0.0 -0.7 0.5 0.2
Private sector unit labour cost5.7 7.3 4.2 3.7 3.9 4.1 3.5 3.1
Household real income* -3.4 1.5 1.3 2.4 2.0 2.7 2.7
Table 3-5
Changes in our projections compared to May 2008
1
For technical reasons, this indicator may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the longer term, however, it follows a similar
trend. 
2
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) type indicator; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
As a result of uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics, from 2004 the actual import figure and current account deficit/external
financing requirement may be higher than suggested by official figures or our projections based on such figures. 
4
Calculated on a cash-flow basis. 
5
According to the CSO LFS data. 
6
According to the original CSO data. The numbers in brackets refer to wages excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
7
Private sector unit labour cost calculated with a wage index excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
* MNB estimate. 
** Data not adjusted for calendar-day variations are shown in brackets.
↔ means that the expected path of the variable will be similar to that of published in the May 2008 Report. 
↑ means that the expected path of the variable might be higher compared to the May 2008 Report.
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The MNB projections are so-called ‘conditional forecasts’. Therefore, they cannot always be directly compared to other projections.
1
In addition to the averages of polled analysts’ responses (the values in the middle), the smallest and largest values are also indicated for the Reuters and
Consensus Economics surveys in order to illustrate distribution.
2
Values calculated by MNB; the projections of the named institutions regarding individual countries are considered with the weights used for calculating
the MNB’s own external demand indicators. This way, the forecast may differ from the numbers published by the aforesaid institutions.
3
OECD did not publish any information on Romania, therefore Romania is not included in our OECD forecast.
Sources: Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (Consensus Economics Inc. (London), July 2008); European Commission Economic Forecasts, Spring
2008; IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2008); Reuters survey (July 2008); OECD Economic Outlook (June 2008).
2007 2008 2009 2010
Consumer Price Index (annual average growth rate, %)
MNB (August 2008) 8.0 6.3 4.1 3.0
Consensus Economics (July 2008)1 - 5.0 – 6.3 – 6.8 3.7 – 4.2 – 4.8 -
OECD (June 2008) 8.0 6.3 3.7 -
European Commission (Spring 2008) 7.9 6.3 3.7 -
IMF (April 2008) 7.9 5.9 3.5 -
Reuters-survey (July 2008)1 - 6.3 – 6.5 – 6.8 3.8 – 4.3 – 4.9 3.0 – 3.2 – 3.6
GDP (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (August 2008) 1.3 2.2 2.6 3.4
Consensus Economics (July 2008)1 - 1.8 – 2.2 – 3.0 2.5 – 3.2 – 4.1 -
OECD (June 2008) 1.3 2.0 3.1 -
European Commission (Spring 2008) 1.3 1.9 3.2 -
IMF (April 2008) 1.3 1.8 2.5 -
Reuters-survey (July 2008)1 - 1.7 – 2.3 – 3.5 2.5 – 3.1 – 3.5 -
Current account deficit (per cent of GDP)
MNB (May 2008) 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.8
OECD (June 2008) 5.0 4.4 4.1 -
European Commission (Spring 2008) 5.0 4.4 3.9 -
IMF (April 2008) 5.6 5.5 5.1 -
Budget deficit (ESA-95 method, per cent of GDP)
MNB (May 2008) 5.5 3.6 3.2 2.7
Consensus Economics (July 2008)1 - 3.1 – 3.7 – 4.3 2.7 – 3.6 – 4.4 -
OECD (June 2008) 5.5 4.1 3.5 -
European Commission (Spring 2008) 5.5 4.0 3.6 -
Reuters-survey (July 2008)1 - 3.4 – 3.7 – 4.0 3.0 – 3.5 – 4.4 -
Forecasts on the size of Hungary's export markets (annual growth rate, per cent)
MNB (August 2008) 8.1 6.4 4.3 5.1
OECD (June 2008)2.3 5.8 6.1 5.9 -
European Commission (Spring 2008)2 6.8 6.2 5.6 -
IMF (April 2008)2 5.9 4.9 4.8 -
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of Hungary's trade partners (annual growth rate, per cent)
MNB (August 2008) 3.9 2.5 1.9 2.1
OECD (June 2008)2,3 3.6 2.5 2.0 -
European Commission (Spring 2008)2 3.7 2.7 2.3 -
IMF (April 2008)2 3.7 2.3 2.0 -
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of euro area (annual growth rate, per cent)
MNB (August 2008) 2.7 1.6 1.4 1.7
OECD (June 2008) 2.6 1.7 1.4 -
European Commission (Spring 2008) 2.7 1.8 1.6 -
IMF (April 2008) 2.6 1.4 1.2 -
Table 3-6
MNB basic forecast compared to other forecasts
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